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INTRODUCTION 
ver since Californians voted to legalize medical marijuana in 
1996, state and federal drug laws have been on something of a 
collision course. In the years since, the United States Supreme Court 
has decided two medical marijuana cases affirming federal authority 
to enforce prohibition laws against patients and providers acting in 
compliance with state laws.1 And, with the exception of a brief 
interval at the beginning of President Barack Obama’s first term in 
office,2 federal officials have exercised this power with great 
	
 Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law. 
1 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that the federal government 
could criminalize the noncommercial intrastate possession and manufacture of marijuana 
as an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity); United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494–95 (2001) (holding that medical necessity 
was not a viable defense to prosecution for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana 
under the federal Controlled Substances Act). 
2 See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, on Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Med. Use of 
Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192 
E
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enthusiasm.3 Though these efforts have impacted the lives of those 
unlucky enough to be targeted by federal prosecutors,4 they have not 
succeeded in blocking the adoption and implementation of state 
medical marijuana laws. Including California, medical marijuana is 
now legal in eighteen states and the District of Columbia.5 In states 
that allow retail medical marijuana establishments, many continue to 
operate openly. 
In November 2012, this conflict took on a new dimension with 
passage of ballot measures legalizing marijuana for recreational use in 
Colorado and Washington. The months since have seen a range of 
proposals for how the federal government should respond to state 
marijuana legalization laws. Prohibitionists have argued in favor of 
trying to block the laws, either by suing on a preemption theory or 
aggressively prosecuting anyone who obtains a state license to 
produce or sell marijuana.6 Others would like to see the federal 
government let Washington and Colorado implement the new laws 
with little or no interference. Colorado Representative Jared Polis, for 
example, has introduced the Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition 
Act, which would “de-federalize” marijuana policy by removing the 
drug from the Controlled Substances Act.7 Until there is a change in 
federal law, some argue that the Obama administration should use its 
enforcement discretion to formally or informally allow Colorado and 
Washington to implement their laws without interference.8 
	
(advising federal prosecutors “not [to] focus federal resources in [their] States on 
individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state 
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana”). 
3 Alex Kreit, Reflections on Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek 
Justice, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1027, 1033–41 (2012) (describing federal enforcement 
against medical marijuana providers following the Ogden memorandum). 
4 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In California, It’s U.S. vs. State Over Marijuana, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2013, at A1 (describing the federal prosecution of medical marijuana 
provider Matthew Davies who is facing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence). 
5 Chelsea Conaboy, Mass. Approves Medical Marijuana Ballot Question, BOS. GLOBE 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2012/11/06/massachusetts        
-voters-approve-ballot-measure-legalize-medical-marijuana/ecE64FD5S4qdRlcXcf2zqJ 
/story.html (reporting that Massachusetts became the eighteenth state to legalize medical 
marijuana after passage of a 2012 ballot measure). 
6 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Administration Weighs Legal Action Against States That 
Legalized Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, at A20 (reporting on Obama 
administration meetings to determine how to respond to the Colorado and Washington 
laws). 
7 Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013). 
8 See, e.g., Mark Kleiman, Use the States as Laboratories for Marijuana Policy, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Nov. 13, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles      
-square/2012/11/use_the_states_as_laboratories041182.php; Mark Osler, U.S. Should 
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These proposals have tended to frame the federal government’s 
options in all-or-nothing terms. Either the federal government tries to 
block the laws or it lets them go forward. But the relationship 
between state and federal laws is not so constrained. This Article 
articulates another option available to the federal government, using 
marijuana policy in the Netherlands as a guide. Congress could 
amend federal drug laws to permit retail sales of marijuana while 
continuing to prohibit its commercial manufacture and wholesale 
distribution. 
To be clear at the outset, I do not argue that this proposal is 
preferable to other alternatives. An approach like this would address 
some of the chief concerns raised by legalization opponents while still 
giving states like Colorado and Washington a great deal of flexibility 
and autonomy. It may therefore represent a compromise position in 
the debate over the federal response to state legalization laws. But 
there would be costs. Retaining a prohibition on manufacture would 
mean leaving a large black market force open in the marijuana trade, 
for example. And it would not eliminate the conflict between federal 
law and state laws entirely, since both Colorado and Washington 
permit commercial manufacture and wholesale distribution. For these 
reasons, among others, I remain personally inclined toward the 
resolution offered by Representative Polis. Nevertheless, I put this 
idea forward as an alternative to existing proposals in the hope that it 
will contribute to a more robust discussion about the interaction 
between state and federal drug laws. 
I 
THE FEAR OF ANOTHER “BIG TOBACCO” AND INSIGHTS FROM THE 
NETHERLANDS 
For many marijuana legalization opponents, the potential impact of 
marijuana advertising and development of a marijuana industry on 
use rates is a central concern. The recently formed marijuana 
prohibition advocacy group, Smart Approaches to Marijuana, lists 
“preventing another big tobacco” as the first issue page on its website, 
	
Honor States’ New Pot Laws, CNN (Nov. 13, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012 
/11/13/opinion/osler-marijuana-federal-law (“The Obama administration should employ 
[its] discretionary power in line with our oldest and best principles and step back from 
continuing marijuana prosecutions in Colorado and Washington.”). 
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for example.9 The group argues that, “if it’s legalized, marijuana will 
be commercialized” and “[a] commercial marijuana industry will act 
just as the tobacco industry acts.”10 This fear is not limited to 
legalization opponents. Prominent marijuana legalization agnostics, 
like Mark Kleiman, often cite the risk of mass marketing of marijuana 
in explaining their position. As Kleiman sees it, “[c]annabis isn’t 
harmful enough to be worth banning. But that doesn’t mean that it’s 
safe to give America’s marketing geniuses a new vice to peddle.”11 
If a big-tobacco-style marijuana industry ever were to develop, 
there would first need to be large-scale marijuana manufacturers 
selling branded products. For example, a convenience store chain like 
7-Eleven might sell cigarettes and alcohol, but manufactures like 
Phillip Morris and Coors are the companies behind nationwide 
marketing of tobacco and alcohol. Similarly, the prospect of 
commercial manufacture and wholesale distribution is likely to 
account for a significant percentage of any reduction in the price of 
marijuana under a legalization system.12 
The experience of the Netherlands is instructive on this point. 
Although there is a perception that the Dutch have legalized 
marijuana, this is not quite true. Rather, “[t]he Netherlands has quasi-
legalized only retail sales, not commercial production and 
distribution.”13 The average Dutch marijuana user or tourist in 
Amsterdam is unlikely to notice this distinction, but most researchers 
believe it helps to explain why marijuana use rates and prices in the 
Netherlands are not much different than in many European countries 
with marijuana prohibition.14 
	
9 Preventing Another Big Tobacco, SMART APPROACHES TO MARIJUANA, 
http://learnaboutsam.com/marijuana-is-like-tobacco/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
10 Id.; see also, e.g., Kevin Sabet, A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on 
Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy, 91 OR. L. REV. 1153, 1173 (2013) 
11 Mark Kleiman, Against Commercial Cannabis, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2010, 1:05 PM 
ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/08/against-commercial-cannabis 
/61492/#; see also JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, ANGELA HAWKEN, BEAU KILMER & MARK 
A.R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 243 
(2012). Kleiman’s preferred marijuana policy would include “noncommercial legalization 
with small consumer-owned co-ops.” Id. 
12 BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., ALTERED STATE? 24 
(2010) (“[N]one of these case studies is directly analogous to full-scale regulated 
legalization—even the Dutch maintain a prohibition on high-level cannabis trafficking and 
large-scale production—and none appears to involve a drop in prices of the magnitude that 
could occur under full legalization.”). 
13 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 128. 
14 See, e.g., Peter H. Reuter, Marijuana Legalization: What Can Be Learned from Other 
Countries? 2 (RAND Drug Policy Research Ctr., Working Paper, July 2010) (“Dutch 
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In 2011, Robert J. MacCoun conducted a thorough review of the 
literature on Dutch marijuana policy. MacCoun found that, although 
“[t]here are several lines of circumstantial evidence that the Dutch 
retail system increased consumption, especially in its early years,” 
today “Dutch citizens use cannabis at more modest rates than some of 
their neighbors, and they do not appear to be particularly likely to 
escalate their use relative to their counterparts in Europe and the 
United States.”15 Similarly, U.S. and Dutch marijuana prices appear 
to be roughly comparable.16 
Why hasn’t legalization had a bigger impact on prices and use in 
the Netherlands? MacCoun cites the Dutch prohibition on commercial 
manufacturing as a probable explanation. He notes it is “likely that 
prices in the Netherlands are elevated by their unusual hybrid regime 
which approximates legalization at the user level, but European style 
prohibition at the level of growers and traffickers.”17 Jonathan 
Caulkins, Angela Hawken, Beau Kilmer, and Mark Kleiman similarly 
argue that “[b]y keeping production and wholesale distribution illegal, 
the Dutch kept their cannabis prices high and marketing to a 
minimum. That situation is a far cry from legalization.”18 
In contrast to the Netherlands, the marijuana legalization laws in 
both Colorado and Washington include the commercial production of 
marijuana. In Washington, those who obtain a marijuana producer’s 
license will be permitted to “produce marijuana for sale at wholesale 
to marijuana processors.”19 In turn, processors will package and 
distribute the produce to retailers.20 In Colorado, marijuana 
cultivation facilities will be licensed to grow marijuana and sell it 
directly to retail stores.21 This feature makes Colorado and 
	
enforcement against growers has kept the retail prices comparable to levels in neighboring 
European countries, though they have not prevented the Netherlands from becoming the 
major European producer for consumption in the European Union.”). 
15 Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis Coffeeshop 
System?, 106 ADDICTION 1899, 1909 (2011). 
16 Id. at 1907 (reviewing price data). 
17 Id. at 1908; see also id. at 1909 (citing the “hybrid system in which high-level 
enforcement probably served to keep prices from dropping the way they might in a full-
scale legalization scheme”). 
18 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 213.  
19 WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.325(1) (2013). 
20 Id. § 69.50.325(2). 
21 COLO. CONST. art. 18, sect. 16, § (2)(h) (amended in 2012). Colorado also lets users 
grow up to six marijuana plants and “transfer of one ounce or less of marijuana without 
remuneration” without having to obtain a permit. Id. § (3). 
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Washington’s laws broader than the Dutch marijuana policy and has 
fueled prohibitionists’ concerns about the impact on use rates. 
II 
PERMITTING RETAIL SALES WHILE PROHIBITING COMMERCIAL 
MANUFACTURE 
The conflict between federal law and the Colorado and Washington 
legalization measures appears to present a choice between two 
options. Either the federal government can try and interfere with these 
laws, or it can let them move forward. But there is room for 
compromise between these two positions. The federal government 
could give states the leeway to implement Netherlands-style retail 
sales while continuing to prohibit the commercial manufacture and 
wholesale distribution of marijuana. 
A policy like this could be accomplished relatively easily as a 
matter of legislative drafting. The main Controlled Substances Act 
offenses are manufacture, distribution, possession with the intent to 
distribute, and possession.22 Congress could allow states to pursue 
quasi-legalization regimes like that of the Netherlands by eliminating 
some of these offenses and altering others for marijuana.23 
For example, consider a regime in which it was no longer a federal 
crime to possess or possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, but 
manufacture and distribution of more than one ounce of the drug were 
still prohibited. In a system like this, federal law would criminalize 
the cultivation and wholesale distribution of marijuana, much like the 
Dutch policy. But states like Colorado and Washington would have 
the freedom to regulate retail marijuana sales outlets without 
significant federal interference. These establishments would be able 
to sell an ounce or less of marijuana to customers—an amount 
consistent with both the Colorado and Washington laws24—without 
violating federal law. Retail stores would need to be able to possess 
large quantities of marijuana in order to operate, of course, and 
	
22 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) (making it a crime “to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance”); id. § 844(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally 
to possess a controlled substance . . . .”). 
23 Congress would also need to make similar changes to additional controlled 
substances offenses. See, e.g., id. § 843(b) (making it a crime “for any person knowingly 
or intentionally to use any communication facility in committing or in causing or 
facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of 
this . . . chapter”). 
24 COLO. CONST. art. 18, sect. 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013. 
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removing federal prohibitions on possession and possession with the 
intent to distribute marijuana would allow them to do this.25 
How would a system like this compare to the status quo and to 
proposals to remove all federal obstacles to state marijuana 
legalization? 
Drug warriors are unlikely to embrace any proposal that is at odds 
with the vision of states as loyal soldiers, dutifully carrying out the 
federal strategy by arresting and prosecuting marijuana offenders. But 
pragmatic prohibitionists might come to see a policy like this as the 
least-bad choice among the federal government’s options for 
responding to state legalization laws.26 This is because, if the 
experience with medical marijuana laws is any indication, it may not 
be possible for the federal government to effectively stop states from 
legalizing marijuana. 
The Supremacy Clause might seem to present a straightforward 
and cost effective method for blocking state marijuana legalization 
laws. Colorado and Washington’s laws certainly make it more 
difficult to enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act, after all. 
So, don’t they stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
Congress’s full objectives under the”27 Controlled Substances Act? 
The problem for any preemption challenge to Colorado and 
Washington is that while the federal government can prosecute 
marijuana cases under the Controlled Substances Act, it cannot 
conscript state and local actors into doing so. The anti-
commandeering principle forbids the federal government from 
forcing states to criminalize conduct28 and, for this reason, would be 
	
25 This basic framework is intended only as an example of how a policy like this might 
work. Details could be modified in any number of ways to allow greater or lesser federal 
oversight of state medical marijuana laws. For example, sentencing reductions for 
commercial manufacture could be incorporated into the proposal. The essential point is 
that federal law could be revised to strike a compromise position between interfering with 
state marijuana legalization laws and letting them go forward without any restriction. 
26 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a 
Federal-State Train Wreck, BROOKINGS, 1 (Apr. 2013), http://www.brookings.edu 
/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/Mari
juana%20Policy%20and%20Presidential%20Leadership_v24.pdf.  
27 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
28 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The Supreme Court recently 
reiterated this principle in even stronger terms in the context of the federal Medicaid 
expansion, holding that the anti-commandeering prohibition applies “whether Congress 
directly commands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal 
regulatory system as its own.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2602 (2012). 
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likely to make any preemption lawsuit dead on arrival.29 Tellingly, 
the federal government has never sued to block any state or local 
medical marijuana law on preemption grounds. 
Direct enforcement may be effective at keeping marijuana stores 
from opening up in Colorado and Washington in the short term, but 
over time it can become a bit like trying to drain the ocean with a 
thimble. This has certainly been the case with medical marijuana.30 
During the Bush administration, the federal government raided nearly 
200 medical marijuana dispensaries and criminally prosecuted a 
number of medical marijuana caregivers. However, around the time 
Bush left office, there were between 300,000 and 400,000 medical 
marijuana patients in California and over 700 medical marijuana 
storefronts in the state.31 Since 2011, the Obama administration has 
waged war on state medical marijuana laws,32 and yet in late-2012, it 
was estimated that there were at least 500 (and perhaps more than 
1,000) dispensaries in Los Angeles alone.33 
The problem for the federal government is that it is almost entirely 
dependent upon states to enforce drug prohibition. In 2010, for 
example, there were 853,838 arrests for marijuana offenses.34 That 
same year, there were only 7,130 marijuana cases disposed of in 
federal court35—just 0.8 percent of the number of arrests. To put this 
	
29 See generally Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (concluding that “only a few state 
marijuana reforms pose a direct conflict with the CSA” such as “[l]aws requiring landlords 
to rent property to marijuana distributors”).. 
30 See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy When States Relax (or 
Abandon) Marijuana Bans, CATO INST., 19–21 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.cato.org 
/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf (arguing that the federal government has been 
unable to effectively stop medical marijuana laws in part because of lack of resources). 
31 Roger Parloff, How Medical Marijuana Became Legal, CNN MONEY (Sept. 18, 
2009, 3:30 PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/11/magazines/fortune/medical 
_marijuana_legalizing.fortune/. 
32 Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012, 9:55 AM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216 (“[T]he Obama 
administration has quietly unleashed a multiagency crackdown on medical cannabis that 
goes far beyond anything undertaken by George W. Bush.”). 
33 Norimitsu Onishi, Marijuana Only for the Sick? A Farce, Some Angelenos Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A16 (“Nobody even knows how many medical marijuana 
dispensaries are in Los Angeles. Estimates range from 500 to more than 1,000. The only 
certainty, supporters and opponents agree, is that they far outnumber Starbucks.”). 
34 Table 29: Estimated Number of Arrests, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/persons 
-arrested (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
35 HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. AT ALBANY, CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS BY OFFENSE AND TYPE OF 
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in perspective, if the federal government were to attempt to prosecute 
all medical marijuana dispensaries in Los Angeles, that would 
represent between a seven percent and fourteen percent increase in the 
number of all federal marijuana cases nationwide. Even more 
revealing, in 2011, there were only thirty-nine federal marijuana 
prosecutions (including medical and non-medical marijuana 
prosecutions) in the Central District of California, which includes Los 
Angeles. 36 This dynamic explains why the federal government has 
been unable to successfully block state medical marijuana laws and, 
in the long run, is not likely to have any more success when it comes 
to state marijuana legalization laws. Indeed, instead of stopping the 
implementation of state medical marijuana laws, the primary effect of 
federal enforcement efforts seems to have been to make state medical 
marijuana laws less well controlled than they otherwise might be.37 
It is worth noting that even if it were possible to effectively block 
implementation of state marijuana legalization laws, federal elected 
officials may not have the political will to pursue this strategy for 
long. One January 2013 poll reported that, while Americans remain 
split roughly evenly in their views on marijuana legalization, a sizable 
majority believes states should have the option to pursue legalization 
laws without federal interference.38 Sixty-eight percent of 
respondents said the federal government should not arrest marijuana 
growers who are in compliance with state law while sixty-four 
percent said sellers in compliance with state law should also be 
protected.39 
	
DISPOSITION, FISCAL YEAR 2010, TABLE 5.24.2010 (2010), available at http://www 
.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf. 
36 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING: PART C6, at 44 (2013), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and 
_Reports/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/Part_C6_Marijuana_Offenses.pdf. 
37 Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an 
Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 569–75 (2010) (arguing that federal 
enforcement has made state medical marijuana laws more difficult to control and easier to 
abuse). 
38 Jacob Sullum, Poll Finds Most Americans Support Treating Marijuana Like Alcohol; 
Even More Think the Feds Should Let States Do So, REASON (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:41 PM), 
http://reason.com/blog/2013/01/31/poll-finds-most-americans-support-treati (reporting that 
fifty-three percent agreed with the statement that “the government should treat marijuana 
the same as alcohol” though only forty-seven percent supported “legalizing marijuana for 
recreational use”). 
39 Id. 
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Given these dynamics, state marijuana legalization opponents who 
are hoping the federal government can block Colorado and 
Washington’s laws may be out of luck. If that is the case, they may be 
better served by focusing attention on the aspects of legalization they 
find most worrisome: commercial manufacture and wholesale 
distribution. This goal is also much more achievable than preventing 
retail storefronts. That is because the number of large manufacturers 
and wholesalers is much smaller than the number of retailers.40 To be 
sure, the government cannot stop all marijuana manufacture and 
distribution. The fact that 42.4% of Americans admit to having used 
marijuana41 despite its decades-long prohibition is a testament to that. 
But it is very likely that the federal government could keep marijuana 
production in the black market in states that legalize marijuana, unlike 
retail sales. This would address the chief concern raised by most 
legalization opponents: the prospect of another big tobacco-type 
industry. 
For similar reasons, limiting federal prohibition to commercial 
manufacture and distribution is likely to be effective at preventing 
spillover effects into non-legalization states. To be sure, legal retail 
outlets in Washington and Colorado might allow individuals from 
other states to purchase up to an ounce of marijuana.42 But, with 
marijuana so readily available already43 retail sales of small quantities 
of marijuana are unlikely to result in a significant amount of 
marijuana importation into other states. Legal commercial 
manufacture and distribution, by contrast, have greater potential to 
decrease the price of marijuana and impact the marijuana market 
nationwide. 
Voters in Colorado and Washington and marijuana legalization 
supporters would not get all that they wish under this proposal. But 
they would be in a better position with respect to federal law and 
	
40 Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from 
Legal Cannabis, 91 OR. L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2013). 
41 Louisa Degenhardt et al., Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and 
Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLOS MED. 1053, 
1057 tbl.2 (2008). 
42 See Jacob Sullum, Colorado Task Force Says Visitors Should be Allowed to Buy 
Marijuana, REASON (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:06 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/02/21 
/colorado-task-force-recommends-letting-v. 
43 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE XIII, at 17 fig.3.P 
(2008), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/articlefiles/380-2008%20Teen%20 
Survey%20Report.pdf (showing twenty-three percent of teens say marijuana is the easiest 
drug for them to buy while only fifteen percent say beer is easier). 
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enforcement than they are now. Permitting retail sales and personal 
possession would also achieve the primary goals of marijuana 
legalization. States would be able to realize significant tax revenue 
and remove the vast majority of marijuana activity from the criminal 
justice system. 
However, there are downsides to this proposal for both legalization 
opponents and advocates. Prohibitionists may prefer to continue to 
fight state legalization laws, even while conceding that they cannot 
block their implementation entirely, in the belief that anything else 
would yield too much ground. Similarly, prohibitionists might worry 
that any change in federal law or policy could encourage more states 
to follow Colorado and Washington’s lead than might do so 
otherwise. 
Those who support taxing and regulating marijuana like alcohol are 
unlikely to find much to recommend in this proposal as compared to, 
for example, Representative Polis’s bill to de-federalize marijuana 
policy entirely. Continuing to prohibit manufacture and wholesale of 
marijuana under federal law would mean the pernicious effects of the 
black market would remain for those activities. Colorado and 
Washington would lose out on tax revenue from producers and a 
significant piece of their laws would remain in conflict with federal 
policy. A system that permits the retail sale and possession of 
marijuana but also continues to criminalize producers would raise 
significant concerns about equity, particularly without any change in 
current federal sentencing laws for marijuana.44 Marijuana 
manufacturers would be violating federal law and could be subject to 
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences, while marijuana retailers 
would be free to operate lawfully and make significant profits. 
Finally, drug producer and transit countries like Mexico may be 
justifiably upset if the United States government were to permit retail 
sales. These countries suffer most of the negative effects of drug 
prohibition,45 and some are interested in the possibility of legalizing 
	
44 Cf. Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Federalism Battles in the War on Drugs: Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 21, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com 
/prawfsblawg/2013/02/federalism-battles-in-the-war-on-drugs-cruel-and-unusual-
punishment.html (posing the question whether a ten-year federal sentence for conduct that 
is legal under state law may constitute cruel and unusual punishment). 
45 E.g., Seth Harp, Note, Globalization of the U.S. Black Market: Prohibition, the War 
on Drugs, and the Case of Mexico, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1665 (2010) (arguing that 
“because drugs are produced abroad, much of the human misery immanent in black 
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drug production.46 How could the United States ask these countries to 
continue to suffer widespread violence and corruption by 
criminalizing marijuana production and wholesale, while its retail sale 
is permitted in Colorado and Washington?47 
CONCLUSION 
The passage of groundbreaking marijuana legalization ballot 
measures in Colorado and Washington has made clear that the 
conflict between states and the federal government on drug policy is 
not likely to subside any time soon. To date, most commentary on this 
conflict has proceeded from the premise that the federal government 
must choose between blocking these laws and allowing them to be 
implemented without interference. 
This Article highlights that there are a range of policy options 
available to federal lawmakers and argues that, within these options, 
there may be room for compromise. This Article outlines one possible 
compromise position based on the Dutch model. Under this idea, the 
federal government would permit states to legalize the retail sale of 
marijuana without interference and focus its efforts on blocking the 
legal manufacture and wholesale distribution of marijuana. 
Neither prohibitionists nor legalization advocates are likely to be 
entirely satisfied by this proposal. But, this Article argues, both 
groups may have reason to view this sort of proposal as an acceptable 
alternative to the current state of affairs. And, if there is one lesson to 
be drawn for marijuana legalization from the federal and state conflict 
over medical marijuana laws, it is that the status quo is not 
sustainable. 
 
	
markets of every kind has been offloaded onto people in third world countries” (footnote 
omitted)). 
46 E.g., THE LATIN AM. COMM’N ON DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY, DRUGS AND 
DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A PARADIGM SHIFT 1 (2009) (arguing that after a decades-long 
war “[w]e are farther than ever from the announced goal of eradicating drugs”). 
47 See Alfonso Serrano, U.S. Marijuana Laws Ricochet Through Latin America, TIME 
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/01/07/u-s-marijuana-laws-ricochet-through-
latin-america/ (“Latin American decisionmakers are now openly questioning why they 
should continue to sacrifice police and soldiers to enforce drug laws when legal markets 
for marijuana now exist in the U.S.”). 
